The End The End And I'm Pooh. And I'm William Cooper. You're listening... I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the republic for which it stands, one nation, under God, intervisible, with liberty and justice for all. And hi, Alicia. You're listening to... Oh, boy, I made a big mistake. Wow. I guess we both made a mistake, huh? Uh-huh. You feel better now? Yeah. Okay. Thank you very much. You're welcome. See you later. Alligator. Okay. After a while, crocodile. Bye. Bye. Say hi to Allison for me. Okay. Pocky said hi, Allison. Woo- Syndes. See you later. Bye. Bye. See you later. Bye. Bye. Amen. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye. The End Ladies and gentlemen, after last night's broadcast, those of you who listened to it, I can assure you that you know more about the National Security Agency than 99.999% of all of the people in the world, outside of those who worked directly for the National Security Agency, or who participate in some collateral duty with that agency, or sit upon some type of oversight committee or board. And I haven't even begun. As part of the effort to provide improved facilities, reduce fragmented operations, and decompress the workforce, the Thanks 2 and Thanks 3 buildings underwent complete renovations, with Thanks 2 housing the National Cryptologic Training Facility, NCS, and Thanks 3 serving as the second campus for the Information Systems Security Organization. All InfoSec resources in the Parkway Center and Airport Square buildings 10, 11, and 20, as well as select elements from Ops 3, were consolidated with existing InfoSec elements at Thanks 3, and all non-InfoSec elements were relocated either within the Airport Square complex or back to Fort Meade. Renovations on the two-story Thanks 2 building were completed in the second quarter of fiscal year 94. As well as meeting all federal accessibility standards, it provided the NCS with 100 classrooms of different sizes, space for non-secure training, space for a satellite training video center, and a 300-seat auditorium. A state-of-the-art thermal ice storage system to supply air conditioning, raised floor throughout, a sprinkler system, a central fire alarm system, a public address system, and 20 transport rooms to enhance communications distribution were also provided. The Thanks 3 design was completed in October 1993. Construction began in January 1994, with planned completion in July 1996. Final move-in of InfoSec personnel will take place in January of 1997. Thanks 3 renovations include an ice storage, heating, ventilation, air conditioning system, primary power, and energy-efficient modular lighting. In addition, Thanks 3 will be equipped with a high-rise fire detection and prevention system, new elevators, select tempest protection, and an emergency generator. InfoSec will occupy all operational space in Thanks 3, with the exception of the utility infrastructure and support services on the first floor. While all support services will remain, several will be moved to accommodate utility expansion and installation of the confirm system in the inner lobby. A joint facilities engineering corps of engineers, InfoSec Thanks 3 design and construction center, has been opened in room B-1119E of Thanks 3. Somebody's sure to get in trouble over that. As many as 12,000 National Security Agency personnel are housed in 1 million square feet of leased space at the Friendship Annex at Airport Square Technology Park and Industrial Park near the Baltimore-Washington International Airport. The Friendship Annex is connected to Fort Meade and other Washington area facilities through the Washington Area Wideband System, or WAWS, which is a coaxial cable network established in the mid-1970s. The National Business Park at Fort Meade, Maryland. There are an additional 240,000 square feet of office space leased at the National Business Park across the BW Parkway from the main facility at Fort Meade. A laboratory for physical sciences at the University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland. The National Security Agency work in the design and development of specialized chips for national security uses is supported by a recently opened laboratory for physical sciences building at the University of Maryland at College Park. This laboratory conducts research on a range of projects of interest to the National Security Agency, including optical communications and computer networks. The National Security Agency sponsors the Supercomputer Research Center in Bowie, Maryland, which includes government, academics, and industry, in an effort to benefit all sectors from its research activities. Gunter Arendt's list of the world's most powerful computing sites shows eSystems in Dallas, Texas, formerly listed as NSA, as the third most powerful site. This listing ranks sites according to ratings, which are ratios to a Cray Y-MP1 based on NASA NPB-BT size A benchmark reports. As of the 10th of July, 1995, the third-ranked facility was listed as eSystems, Dallas, Texas, with 8 Cray C-916-16-512 computers and 9 Cray J-916-16-512 computers. This listing is compiled, ladies and gentlemen, based in part on information provided in confidence or anonymously. The Dallas entry was based on information supplied by an individual who indicated that during the summer of 1994, the National Security Agency advertised employment opportunities in a Dallas newspaper, with the advertisement noting that a certain number of Cray 916s were being installed at a Dallas site, specifically Cray C-916s, with a planned increase in 1995 to the current number. As this listing is widely publicized on the Internet, reader feedback usually corrects erroneous entries. And thus far, this listing has not been disputed. In addition, the total number of Cray C-916s in the world, all of which are included in this listing, is consistent with published production of this computer by inclusion of the computers at the Dallas facility. eSystems has two facilities in the Dallas vicinity. eSystems, Inc. Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31st, 1994, Securities and Exchange Commission, File Number 1-5237. Buildings at the Greenville, Texas facility covered 2,936,000 square feet with activities including offices, engineering, research and development, production, airborne electronic systems installation, and aircraft overhaul and maintenance. The Garland, Texas facility has 1,407,000 square feet of building including offices, engineering, research and development, production facilities, radiation laboratory, electronic components, high-powered transmitters, and radar antennas and other products. It would seem that the National Security Agency, Crays, are at one or the other site, most likely the Greenville site, which would seem to be the SIGINT side of the company. Garland appears to be the defense electronics, in effect, non-SIGINT side of the company, and thus the Crays are out at Greenville. However, the 10-K form also lists other properties with a total of 1,243,000 square feet, including offices, production, and depot maintenance of electronic equipment and systems. This includes approximately 899,000 square feet at various locations owned by the United States government and operated by the company. These would appear to be depot maintenance for rivet joint, which is a code word for a project, and other airborne SIGINT systems. But it cannot be excluded that this also includes some unacknowledged National Security Agency facility where all the Crays have been stashed, such as perhaps the overly large Federal building in downtown Dallas. Army National SIGINT responsibilities include management of the creation and operation of the Regional SIGINT Operations Centers, RSOC, at Fort Cordon, Georgia, Bad Abling Station, Germany, and Minwith Hill Station, England, as well as continued Army support to the National Security Agency, NSA, and its worldwide mission stations. Army Intelligence in Transition, Changing Horizons, American Intelligence Journal, Autumn, Winter, 1993-1994, pages 17-20, and other RSOC locations include the Lackland Air Force Base Training Annex in San Antonio, Texas, which supports Southern Command and Pacific Command support from Kunia on Oahu, Hawaii, an installation where I once worked while in the Navy. The National Security Agency operates a global network of ground stations for the interception of civil and military satellite communications traffic. Bad Abling, Kassern, Germany, conducts satellite communications, interception activities, and is also a downlink station for geostationary SIGINT satellites. Menwith Hill, located 13 kilometers west of Harrogate, United Kingdom, collects against Russian satellite communications under Project Moonpenny, and is also a downlink station for geostationary SIGINT satellites. Misawa Air Base, Misawa, Japan, satellite communications intercept activities include collecting against Russian Molniya, Raduga, and Gorizant systems under Project Lady Love at a facility six kilometers northwest of the main airfield known as The Hill. Rossman Communications Research Station near Rossman, North Carolina, has a total of 12 antennas for satellite communications interception, for communications connectivity with other intelligence facilities, and possibly also for downlinks from geostationary SIGINT satellites. Sugar Grove Naval Communications Facility near Sugar Grove, West Virginia, intercepts Pacific Intel SAT, COMSTAT satellite communications traffic routed through the COMSTAT ground station at ETHAM, West Virginia. This facility has four antennas with diameters of 9.2, 18.5, 32.3, and 46 meters. Yakima Research Station near Yakima, Washington, intercepts Pacific Intel SAT, COMSTAT satellite communications traffic. Additional COMSTAT intercept activities are conducted at Geraldton, Australia, and Bood in Cornwall, or I should say Corwall, United Kingdom. The Bad Abling and Menwith Hill facilities are also used for downlink of high-altitude SIGINT satellite product, as are facilities at Pine Gap, Australia, and Buckley Air National Guard Base in Colorado. other National Security Agency facilities, including Clark Air Force Base Philippines, Sinop Turkey, Heralian Greece, Berlin, Germany, and Eilson Air Force Base Alaska, have closed, with others, such as San Vito de Normani, Italy, have transferred to other agencies, in this case, to Air Force Space Command. The National Security Agency National SIGINT Operations Center, or NSOC, provides round-the-clock continuous service and support to customers through a worldwide communications network. NSOC is provided with the most modern, integrated data and telecommunication infrastructure possible to meet the real-time requirements of military and other intelligence consumers at every echelon. the National Security Agency in the 19, August 1993 activation of the Medina Regional SIGINT Operations Center, or RSOC, at the Lackland Training Annex, also known as the Medina Training Annex, in San Antonio, was a direct result of the end of the Cold War, which confronted the intelligence community with a downsizing force structure and withdrawal of forces deployed overseas. The Medina RSOC consolidates SIGINT assets, analytical databases, and experienced personnel from various locations. It also provided tactical analysts an environment to keep their cryptologic skills sharp, supporting a pool of capable people which can deploy wherever they are needed. By 1996, over 1,000 Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and National Security Agency civilian personnel will work at Medina. This consolidated SIGINT joint environment improved the ability to deliver timely tailored intelligence to consumers. years. In early 1993, the relocation of the 513th Military Intelligence Brigades from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Fort Cordon, Georgia, was initiated. Under the terms of the Army Regulation 5-10 study, the 513th will be developed into a power projection support element. As part of this process, the National Security Agency established a continental United States-based regional operations facility, or CROF, at Fort Cordon. The regional SIGINT operations center uses current operations and troop facilities, as well as a new 38,000-square-foot building to support 300 Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps SIGINT personnel. The CBOF incorporates tactical and strategic units through Trojan and other satellite networks to support requirements from theater commanders and joint task force, or JTF components, as well as intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Trojan Spirit supports split-based connectivity between continental United States-based processing and production centers and forward deployed forces. Minworth Hill in the United Kingdom is the principal NATO theater ground segment node for high-altitude signals intelligence, satellites, such as Ball, Desmond, Pine Gap, Allen, and Unwind, Sydney, 1988. Although this facility is jointly operated with the UK's General Communications Headquarters, or GCHQ, it is not privy to the intelligence downlinked to Minworth Hill, since tapes containing the data are returned via air to the United States for analysis. Minworth Hill Station was established in 1956 by the United States Army Security Agency, or ASA. Inside the closely guarded 560-acre base are two large operations blocks and many satellite tracking dishes and domes. Initial operations focused on monitoring international cable and microwave communications passing through Britain. In the early 1960s, Minworth Hill was one of the first sites in the world to receive sophisticated early IBM computers, with which the National Security Agency automated the labor-intensive watch list scrutiny of intercepted but unencifered telex messages. Since then, Minworth Hill has sifted the international messages, telegrams, and telephone calls of citizens, corporations, or governments to select information of political, military, or economic value to the United States. Every detail of Minworth Hill's operation has been kept an absolute secret. The official cover story is that the all-civilian base is a Department of Defense communications station, and the hour of the time is blowing their cover forever tonight. The British Ministry of Defense described Minworth Hill as a communications relay center. Like all good cover stories, this has a strong element of truth to it. Until 1974, Minworth Hill's SIGINT specialty was evidently the interception of international leased carrier signals, the communications links run by civil agencies, the post, telegraph, and telephone ministries of eastern and western European countries. The National Security Agency took over Minworth Hill in 1966. Interception of satellite communications began at Minworth Hill as early as 1974, when the first of more than eight large satellite communications dishes were installed. in 1984, British Telecom and MOD staff completed a $25 million extension to Minworth Hill station known as code word steeplebush. The British government constructed new communications facilities and buildings for steeplebush, worth 7.4 million pounds. The expansion plan includes a 50,000 square foot extension to the operations building and new generators to provide 5 megawatts of electrical power. The purpose of the new construction was to boost... Trying to figure out what this... is to the new construction was to boost and cater for an expanded mission of satellite surveillance. It also provides a new satellite Earth Terminal System to support the classified systems at the site. With another 17.2 million being spent on special monitoring equipment, this section of the Minworth Hill base alone cost almost $160 million. The Rossman Research Station is located in the Pisgah National Forest of North Carolina's Smoky Mountains near Balsam Grove, North Carolina, off Route 215, approximately 11 kilometers north of Route 64. The station, which closed in 1994, was operated by approximately 250 National Security Agency, Bendix Field Engineering, and TRW employees. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration began operations at the Rossman Space Flight Tracking Station in 1963 and ceased activities there in January of 1981. During NASA's tenure, the station supported a number of space projects, including the HONI Apollo and Apollo Soyuz missions. The station at Rossman was turned over to the General Services Administration by NASA on 1 February 1981. The facility was converted by the Department of Defense for use as a communications research station, a process which was completed in early July 1981. Initially, there were approximately 35 contract personnel living in the area, but when the project became operational in July, this number increased to approximately 75 employees. The National Security Agency role at Rossman apparently began almost immediately thereafter. By 1985, this number was reported to have grown to 250 employees with annual payroll at $5 million, an average of $20,000 a year. The Asheville Citizen, 20 June 1985. For fiscal year 85, the NSA requested $500,000 for construction of an electric substation to provide additional electric transformer capacity that is required to support station operations. It is difficult to ascertain the total number of satellite-receiving antennae at the facility. These, at least, include two very large dishes approximately 27.5 feet in diameter, the size of the biggest dish left by NASA, and a smaller 6.2-meter radome. The Rossman station was used to intercept telephone and other communications traffic carried by commercial and other communications satellites in geostationary orbit over the western hemisphere. Potential targets of interest could include Latin American military, diplomatic, and commercial traffic, as well as domestic United States traffic and drug traffickers in the Caribbean. The SIGINT, or Foreign Intelligence Mission, of the National Security Agency, CSS, involves the interception, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information derived from foreign electrical communications and other signals. SIGINT itself is composed of three elements. Communications, Intelligence, which is COMINT, Electronics Intelligence, which is ELINT, and Telemetry Intelligence, which is TELINT. COMINT is intelligence information derived from the interception and analysis of foreign communications. ELINT is technical and intelligence information derived from electromagnetic radiations, such as radars. TELINT is technical and intelligence information derived from the interception, processing, and analysis of foreign telemetry. The COMSEC mission protects United States telecommunications and certain other communications from exploitation by foreign intelligence services and from unauthorized disclosure. COMSEC systems are provided by the National Security Agency to 18 government departments and agencies, including Defense, State, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The predominant user, however, is the Department of Defense. COMSEC is a mission separate from SIGINT, yet the dual SIGINT and COMSEC missions of the National Security Agency and CSS do have a symbiotic relationship and enhance the performance of the other. Initially, most SIGINT was collected by personnel of the service cryptologic agencies located around the world. The director, NSA, chief, CSS, has authority for SIGINT missions. The National Security Agency responds to requests by other members of the intelligence community, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to provide signals intelligence on topics of interest. An annual list of SIGINT requirements is given to the National Security Agency and is intended to provide the National Security Agency director and the Secretary of Defense with guidance for the coming year's activities. These requirements are usually stated in terms of general areas of intelligence interest, but are supplemented by amplifying requirements, which are time-sensitive and are expressed directly to the National Security Agency by the requesting agency. The National Security Agency exercises discretion in responding to these requirements. It also accepts requests from the executive branch agencies. states. But the National Security Agency does not, it says, generate its own requirements. The National Department of Nights at Midnight, one more night without sleeping. Watch it till the mornings I'm breathing. Green door, watch that sleep for your sleeping. There's an old piano and they play it hot behind the green door. Don't know what they're doing, but they laugh a lot behind the green door. Wish they'd let me in so I could find out what's behind the green door. I've once liked it and I've been there. Hospitality's still there. wonder just what's going on in town. Saw an eyeball people through a smoke deep loud behind the green door. When I said no, sadly someone laughed out loud behind the green door. All the wall is gonna have deep loud behind the green door. Oh, ladies and gentlemen, the hour of the time is brought to you by Swiss America Trading. Call them. Tell them that you're a steady listener to William Cooper in the hour of the time. Ask for the newsletter. Get a chunk of that red carpet treatment. Tell them you want to get your hands on some real constitutional legal and awful money to protect you. against what is sure to come. Have you been taking a look at all the indicators? My God, how they can lie. And the market keeps going up and up and up based upon what? The exploitation of third world workers in factories where Americans used to earn living for their families? Call Swiss America Trading 1-800-289-2646. Talk to Frank. You all like Frank. You all know Frank. You've all heard Frank. You'll hear him again this Thursday night. 1-800-289-2646. Do it now, folks. You'll be glad you did. You know how you tend to procrastinate, just like me. 1-800-289-2646. Do it now. What are you thinking about it? What are you thinking about it? What are you thinking about it? One more night without sleeping. Watch it till the morning comes sleeping. Green door, what's that secret you're keeping? Green door, what's that secret you're keeping? Green door! Oh, yes. The green door. Wonder what they're doing back there. I bet they're just playing poker. What do you think? Ladies and gentlemen, what you heard last night, what you're hearing tonight makes you the only people in the world to know anything about the National Security Agency. And up until last night, most of you never even heard of it. And what you heard about it wasn't very much at all. Most of it was bullshit. All requirements levied on the National Security Agency, they say, must be for foreign intelligence. We know that is not true. Yet the precise definition of foreign intelligence is unclear. and there is a law which exempts the National Security Agency from obeying the law. You didn't know that, did you? The National Security Agency limits its collection of intelligence, they say, to foreign communications, and confines its activities to communications links, having at least one foreign terminal. Nevertheless, this is based upon an internal regulation and is not supported by law or executive branch directive, and they are not bound to monitor only foreign communications. Although the National Security Agency says that it limits itself to collecting communications with at least one foreign terminal, it may still pick up communications between two Americans when international communications are involved. and we know that they monitor communications within the United States on a regular basis. Whenever the National Security Agency chooses particular circuits or links known to carry foreign communications necessary for the production of foreign intelligence, it collects all transmissions that go over those circuits. Given current technology, the only gray for NSA to prevent the processing of communications of United States citizens would be to control the selection, analysis, or dissemination phases of the process. Communications intelligence has been an integral element of United States intelligence activities. Foreign communications have been intercepted, analyzed, and decoded by the United States since the Revolutionary War. During the 1930s, elements of the Army and Navy collected and processed foreign intelligence from radio transmissions. much of their work involved decryption, as well as enciphering United States transmissions. Throughout World War II, their work contributed greatly to the national effort. since President Truman authorized the National Security Agency's establishment in 1952 to coordinate United States cryptologic and communications activities, tremendous advances have been made in the technology of communications intelligence. These advances have contributed to an expansion in demands for a wider variety of foreign intelligence and of requirements placed upon the National Security Agency, CSS, SIGINT personnel, and resources. As new priorities arise in the requirements process, greater demands are placed upon the National Security Agency. SIGINT, ladies and gentlemen, is not finished intelligence. In fact, all of the information that was gathered to make up this report was not finished intelligence. SIGINT are just bits and pieces of broadcast communications. But the National Security Agency provides its specially controlled SIGINT product directly to military commands worldwide and to governmental consumers as well as to producers of all source intelligence who then analyze, collate, and do what we do in the intelligence service, which is a symbol, pieces of puzzles, to give us a big picture. The National Security Agency supports each NIO with a senior to a special or regional specialist called a signals intelligence, NIO or SINIO, and SINIOs and other representatives of the director, National Security Agency, and the NSA deputy director for operations are assigned to facilitate the exchange of information and conduct liaison on operational matters throughout the IC and with the consumers of SIGINT. The SIGINT product, ladies and gentlemen, is extremely sensitive and is normally handled in special channels available to only specifically designated personnel. there is a SIGINT digest. It is a compilation published Monday through Friday. Although not considered finished intelligence, the digest apprises readers of the most significant developments of the day that were derived from SIGINT. The digest is distributed in hard copy to Washington area customers and electronically to customers in the field. subject to the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 6, or NSCID No. 6, and the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and pursuant to the authorities vested in the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Agency is a separately organized agency within the Department of Defense under the direction, supervision, funding, maintenance, and operation of the Secretary of Defense. And that should dispel a lot of the bullshit that floats around out there that the National Security Agency answers only to the President and all the other crap that I hear all the time. Which, like I've told you before, 99.9% of everything that is passed through the hands of so-called patriot and militia organizations is 100% bullshit. The National Security Agency is a unified organization structured to provide for the signals intelligence or SIGINT mission of the United States and to ensure secure communication systems for all departments and agencies of the United States government. The Central Security Service will conduct collection, processing, and other SIGINT operations as assigned. signals intelligence. SIGINT is a category of intelligence information comprising all communications intelligence. COMINT, electronics, intelligence, elint, and telemetry, intelligence, talent. COMINT is technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communication by other than the intended recipients. COMINT is produced by the collection and processing of foreign communications passed by electromagnetic means with specific exceptions, which are, which I will state, and by the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted. collection comprises search, intercept, and direction finding. Processing comprises range estimation, transmitter, operator identification, signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, study of plain text, the fusion of these processes, and the reporting of results. COMINT does not include, and this is the exceptions that I told you that I would give you. COMINT does not include intercept and processing of unencrypted written communications, except the processing of written plain text versions of communications which have been encrypted or are intended for subsequent encryption. Intercept and processing of press, propaganda, and other public broadcasts, except for processing encrypted or hidden meaning passages in such broadcasts. Oral and wire interceptions conducted under the Department of Defense Directive 5200.24 are censorship. ELINT, ladies and gentlemen, is technical and intelligence information derived from foreign non-communications. Electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation are radioactive sources. ELINT is produced by the collection, which is the observation and recording, and the processing for subsequent intelligence purposes of that information. TELINT is technical and intelligence information derived from the intercept processing and analysis of foreign telemetry. SIGINT operational control is the authoritative direction of SIGINT activities, including tasking and allocation of effort, and the authoritative prescription of those uniform techniques and standards by which SIGINT information is collected, processed, and reported. SIGINT resources comprise unit, activities, and organizational elements engaged in the conduct of SIGINT, comment, ELINT, or talent activities. SIGINT is the combination of all of the above. The National Security Agency consists of a director, a headquarters, and such subordinate units, elements, facilities, and activities as are assigned to the National Security Agency by the Secretary of Defense as the executive agent of the government for the conduct of SIGINT. The National Security Agency provides technical guidance to all SIGINT, or SIGINT-related operations of the government. It formulates programs, plans, policies, procedures, and principles, and manages assigned SIGINT resources, personnel, and, of course, programs. The National Security Agency produces and disseminates SIGINT in accordance with the objectives, requirements, and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence, or DCI. This function does not include the production and dissemination of finished intelligence, which are the responsibilities of departments and agencies other than the National Security Agency Central Security Service. In relation to the Department of Defense SIGINT activities, the National Security Agency prepares and submits to the Secretary of Defense a consolidated program program and budget and requirements for military and civilian manpower, logistic and communication support, and research, development, test, and evaluation, together with his recommendations pertaining thereto. The National Security Agency conducts research, development, and systems designed to meet the needs of the National Security Agency Central Security Service and coordinate with the departments and agencies their related research, development, test, and evaluation in the SIGINT field. The agency determines and submits to the Secretary of Defense logistic support requirements for the National Security Agency and the Central Security Service, together with specific recommendations as to what each of the responsible departments and agencies of the government should supply. It also develops requisite security rules, regulations, and standards governing operating practices in accordance with the policies of the United States Intelligence Board and the United States Communications Security Board. The Director prescribes within the field of authorized operations requisite security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling, and distribution of SIGINT material within and among the elements under his control, and exercise the necessary monitoring and supervisory control to ensure compliance with the regulations. The Director makes reports and furnishes information to the United States Intelligence Board or the United States Communications Security Board, as required. The Director also responds to the SIGINT requirements of all Department of Defense components and other departments and agencies, eliminates unwarranted duplication of SIGINT efforts, standardizes SIGINT equipment and facilities wherever practicable, and provides for production and procurement of SIGINT equipments. The National Security Agency provides the Director of Central Intelligence through the Secretary of Defense with such information as required on the past, current, and proposed plans, programs, and costs of the SIGINT activities under the agency's control. It also provides guidance to the military departments to affect and ensure sound and adequate military and civilian SIGINT career developments and training programs, and conduct, or otherwise provides for necessary specialized and advanced SIGINT training. The agency provides technical advice and support to enhance SIGINT arrangements with foreign governments and conducts, as authorized, SIGINT exchanges with foreign governments. The Central Security Service is comprised of a Chief Central Security Service, a Deputy Chief, jointly staffed Headquarters, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force operating elements, and such other subordinate elements and facilities as may be assigned to the Central Security Service by the Secretary of Defense. The Director, National Security Agency, is also the Chief Central Security Service. The Director of the National Security Agency, Chief Central Security Service, has a Deputy Director for the National Security Agency and a Deputy Chief, Central Security Service, to provide continuity in SIGINT matters. The Deputy Director, National Security Agency, is a technically experienced civilian. The Deputy Chief, Central Security Service, is a commissioned officer of the military services of not less than two-star rank designated by the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Chief is normally not to be selected from the same military service as the Chief. The Director and Deputy Director of the National Security Agency are designated by the Secretary of Defense, subject to the approval of the President. The Director is a commissioned officer of the military services on active or reactivated status and enjoys not less than three-star rank during the period of his incumbency. The Director, National Security Agency, Chief, Central Security Service, reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. The commanders of the service cryptologic organizations and their subordinate activities, which conduct SIGINT operations, are subordinate to the Chief, Central Security Service, for all matters involving SIGINT activities. In this role, they are designated as service element commanders and subordinate activities of the Central Security Service. The service cryptologic organizations will remain in their parent services for the purpose of administrative and logistic support. The Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may specifically designate other SIGINT-related resources of the Department of Defense, which will be subordinate to the Chief, Central Security Service, for SIGINT operations. Now, subject to the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Director, National Security Agency, Chief, Central Security Service, accomplishes the SIGINT mission of the National Security Agency, Central Security Service. The Director acts as principal SIGINT advisor to the Secretary of Defense. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As principal SIGINT advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director, National Security Agency, keeps the Joint Chiefs of Staff fully informed on SIGINT matters. The Director exercises SIGINT operational control over SIGINT activities of the United States government to respond most effectively to military and other SIGINT requirements. In the case of mobile military SIGINT platforms, the Director shall state movement requirements through appropriate channels to the military commanders, which retain responsibility for operational command of the vehicle. Subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Director, National Security Agency, Chief, Central Security Service, is specifically delegated authority to exercise SIGINT operational control over SIGINT activities of the United States. Issue directives to any operating elements such instructions and orders necessary to carry out his responsibilities and functions and have direct access to and direct communications with any element of the United States government performing SIGINT functions. The National Security Agency Director may adjust as required through the service cryptologic organizations, personnel resources under SIGINT operational control, and centralize or consolidate SIGINT operations for which he is responsible to the extent desirable, consistent with efficiency, economy, effectiveness, and support to field commanders. The Director submits, as appropriate, concurrent letter of evaluation, efficiency, and fitness reports of the commanders of subordinate elements of the Central Security Service in accordance with parent service procedures, and delegates SIGINT operational tasking of specified SIGINT resources and facilities for such periods and for such operational tasks as required or as directed by the Secretary of Defense. The National Security Agency prescribes SIGINT procedures for activities to whom he provides technical guidance and prescribes, reviews, and approves security rules, regulations, and instructions. It conducts the SIGINT operations undertaken in support of certain missions within the purview of NSCID No. 5 and obtains such information and intelligence material from the departments and agencies, military departments, other Department of Defense agencies, or other departments or agencies of the government, as may be necessary for the performance of the National Security Agency Central Security Service functions. Now, in the performance of its responsibilities and functions, the National Security Agency Central Security Service coordinates actions as appropriate with other Department of Defense components and other departments and agencies of the government. The agency maintains direct liaison as appropriate for the exchange of information and advice in the field of its assigned responsibility with other DOD components and other departments and agencies of the government. It provides for direct liaison by representatives of the intelligence components of individual departments and agencies regarding interpretation and amplification of requirements and priorities within the framework of objectives, requirements, and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence. Other Department of Defense components provide support within their respective fields of responsibility to the Director, National Security Agency, and Chief Central Security Service as may be necessary to carry out assigned responsibilities and functions. The National Security Agency Central Security Service will be authorized such personnel, facilities, funds, and other administrative support as the Secretary of Defense deems necessary for the performance of its functions. Other Department of Defense components shall provide support for the agency and service as prescribed in specific directives or support agreements. The Naval Security Group Command is the Navy component of the Central Security Service. The Army CSS component is the Intelligence and Security Command, also known as NSCOM, which we will cover in full on another night. NSCOM organizations which perform national SIGINT functions are being restructured from conventional Oconis lines of sight and high-frequency collection mission units into jointly manned organizations at continental United States locations with the access to enemy signals provided via remote collection technology and communications linkings. In effect, satellites. The Army Technical Control and Analysis Element, or ATCAE, and the 704th Military Intelligence Brigade at Fort Meade will direct the Army's SIGINT exploitation efforts in support of operational commanders and national collection needs, and will assist in technical training and support for all Army Intelligence Forces as part of preparations for deployment. The 694th Intelligence Group, formerly the 694th Intelligence Wing, headquartered at Fort Meade, Maryland, steers Air Force Intelligence Agency's mission operations on the East Coast, and we will also cover that agency in full on another night. Ladies and gentlemen, I hope you appreciate the education that you're getting. We're doing this to apprise our enemies of our capabilities and of our professionalism, and to educate the American public. We are engaged in an information war, as well as a war of ideals. If we do not win this war, we will be slaves in a totalitarian socialist new world order. Good night, and God bless you all. God bless you all, all of us. God bless you all, to help you with炭, you Naomi 감사합니다. God bless you all, God bless you all, this chokinglaw grammyung, the Aha Channing明 wie may Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.